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Abstract- Electronic commerce has pushed and benefitted 
from the  development of mobile agents technology. One of the 
reasons is electronic commerce needs remote searching and nego- 
tiating between one customer and a number of E-shops. Mobile 
agents can travel over the Intranet or Internet. Therefore, mobile 
agents can help the customer or E-shops with remote searching 
and negotiating. However, because of the heterogeneousness of 
the networks the mobile agents migrate to, security issues should 
be tackled with cautions. This paper presents a new secure 
electronic commerce protocol. The underlying transactions are 
accomplished with mobile agents. A trusted third party (in fact, 
a trusted authority) is involved in the protocol. 
Keywords: Auditing, Electronic commerce, Fair identifiability, 
Mobile agent, Purchase plan. 
I. ‘INTRODUCTION 
The mobile agent paradigm has been proposed as a promis- 
ing solution to facilitate distributed computing over open and 
heterogeneous networks. Mobility, autonomy, and intelligence 
are identified as key features of mobile agent systems and en- 
abling characteristics for the next-generation smart electronic 
commerce on the Internet. However, security and privacy in the 
mobile agent technology should be settled with cautions, since 
the mobile agents will migrate to the heterogeneous networks 
for the tasks of transactions. 
We present an agent-based scenario for mobile commerce 
and discuss techniques using mobile agents with trusted third 
party that have been implemented to provide security in this 
scenario. 
Consider such a scenario: There is a customer C who 
decides to buy flight tickets on the Internet. We look on this 
decision as a current purchase plan. For this purchase plan, C 
defines the purchase requirement (e.g. travel Iine, maximum 
price of ticket, arrival time,’valid pyiod of this purchase, etc.). 
And then, the customer arranges some mobile agents to search 
over the Internet (actually these mobile agents migrate to some 
E-Shops, i.e. some Travel Agents Servers). These E-shops 
will bid for this purchase requirement of the current purchase 
plan. Each E-shop wishes her own bidding will be successfully 
selected by the Customer as an optimal one. In order to make 
this bid confirmed and accepted by the Customer, each E- 
Shop will put a legal signature on the bid. This will not 
only help the underlying E-Shop improv? the possibility of 
the Customer accepting this bid, but also help the Customer 
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to verify whether this bid is really from the underlying E- 
Shop, as well as prevent this E-Shop from denying providing 
this bid for the purchase plan. In addition, other E-shops could 
not fabricate a valid bid to impersonate the successful bidder. 
Here the successful bidder is the E-shop, whose bid is accepted 
and paid by the customer. An additional state of this scenario 
is the underlying E-shop denies either bidding any purchase 
plan of the customer or receiving any money to her account. 
In this paper we will propose a secure transaction protocol 
to address the above scenario. The underlying techniques are 
based on a new proxy signature scheme[4]. Han et al have 
presented another new proposal for secure transactions using 
mobile agents with agent broker. Their method is based on the 
concept of undetachable signatures [ZI. 
Our protocol is designed to protect jnanciul situations 
or rights of the customer. This is maintained through the 
signature on the bid from the corresponding E-shop. Therefore, 
it can not only help the Customer to verify whether this bid 
is really from the underlying E-Shop, but also prevent this E- 
Shop from denying providing this bid for the purchase plan. 
Another issue is some previous solutions have the security 
flaw [ 5 ] ,  [6], [8], [ l l ] ,  [14]. In detail, the customer can forge 
valid bid on behalf of the E-shops. consequently, the customer 
can blackmail the underlying E-shop by the fabricated bid [ 161. 
Then, the financial situation of the E-shops will be spoiled 
by the customer. In our protocol, the customer is not able to 
forge any valid bid on behalf of any E-shop involved in the 
transactions. ’ 
In our protocoI, a trusted third party is invohed in the 
transaction. The trusted third party (TTP) in our paper satisfies 
two conditions: (1) The trusted third party does exactly what 
it is expected to do. This means (a) No less than it is supposed 
to do, so that TTP commits no acts of commission, such as, 
”Oh, I forgot to lock the door.” and (b) No less than it is 
expected to do, so that TTP commits no acts of commission, 
such as, ”Oh, I accidently made an extra key and gave it to 
Eve.” (2) The trusted third party always adhere to the related 
security law and policy. Therefore, a reputable bank (or a legal 
ahd reputable association, etc.) is able to play the role of the 
trusted third party [16], [19]. Based on this point, the trusted 
third party in our paper is indeed a trusted authority. 
The organization of the rest of our paper is as follows: 
Section. 2 introduces the model of secure transactions using 
mobile agents with a trusted third party. Section 3 presents 
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a new protocol according to the proposed model. Section 4 
provides construction analysis, security analysis, and privacy 
analysis. The performance analysis is presented in section 5. 
The concluding remarks are provided in section 6.  
II. MODEL OF TRANSACTIONS U ING MA WITH TTP 
In this section, we will propose a model for secure transac- 
tions using mobile agents (MAS) with the trusted third party 
(TTP). The motivation to propose this model is the needing 
of a universa1 framework for the E-commerce protocols of 
secure transactions using mobile agents as a mediate. This 
model integrates the serviceability of a trusted third party. 
Model 1 (Model of Transactions Using MA with TTP) 
There are at least four participants involving in the model. 
They include: a customer, a trusted third party, an E-shop (at 
least one E-shop involving), and a mobile agent (at least one 
mobile agent involving). Besides these participants, there are 
seven procedures for the proposed model. These procedures 
detiver the specifications for the electronic commerce protocol 
using mobile agents with TTP. The followings provide the 
details for the model. 
(1) System Setup: This procedure is a probabilistic poly- 
nomial time algorithm [16]. It generates global parameters as 
well as Eocul parameters for the participants involving this 
procedure. 
(2) Interaction between E-Shop and TTP: This procedure 
is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm. It generates the 
pseudonyms and partial private keys for the E-Shops, who plan 
to sell goods in the protocol. 
(3) Preparing Mobile Agents: This procedure is a polyno- 
mial time algorithm. It involves the interactions between the 
customer and its mobile agents. 
(4) Mobile Agents Migrating: This procedure is a determin- 
istic polynomial time algorithm. In this procedure, the mobile 
agents are equipped with a purchase request (It includes the 
purchase requirements and some ciphertexts of partial secrets). 
And then, mobile agents migrate to some E-shops. E-shops 
will first check whether this purchase request is legal. 
(5) Processing Transactions: This is a probabilistic polyno- 
mial time algorithm. The underlying E-shop first constructs the 
bidding key, by which this E-shop is able to make bidding for 
the purchase request. The process of bidding for the purchase 
request is, in fact, fhe process ufsigning E-shops' bid. 
(6)  Checking Transactions: This procedure is a deterministic 
polynomial time algorithm. The customer first checks whether 
the returned purchase requirement is still the one previously 
delivered by the mobile agents. In addition, the time-stamp is 
examined whether it is still valid. If the two items are both 
good, the customer will verify the signature on the bid. and 
also the bid is an optimal one, the customer will accept this 
(7) Auditing E-Shop: This procedure is a probabilistic 
polynomial time algorithm. This procedure is usually off-line, 
except that the underlying E-shop does not take its duty in the 
transaction. 
111. PROPOSED PROTOCOL FOR TRANSACTIONS U ING 
MA WITH TTP 
In this section we will propose a new protocol for transac- 
tions using mobile agents with a TTP. The proposed protocol 
is specified according to the new model given in section 2. 
Therefore, this protocol includes the following procedures: 
System Setup, Interaction between' E-Shops and TTP, Prepar- 
ing Mobile Agents, Mobile Agents Migrating, Processing 
Transactions, and Checking Transactions, as well as Auditing 
i-th E-Shop. A new proxy signature scheme [] is implied 
in the protocol. Its security is based on the security of 
DSS. Therefore, the proposed electronic commerce protocol 
has the same security level with the DSS. In addition, fair 
identifiability as a new security and privacy mechanism is 
maintained in the protocol. 
A. System Setup 
In this subsection, we will set up the system parameters 
for the proposed protocol. In the proposed protocol, there 
are at least four different participants: a Customer, a Trusted 
Third Party, an E-Shop, and the Mobile Ageits (at least one 
Mobile Agent involving in the underlying transactions). The 
followings are the specifications of the global parameters as 
well as the the local parameters: 
( I )  Choice of Global Parameters There is a large prime p .  
Its bit-length is L, i.e. Z L - '  < p < 2 L ;  where L is a multiple 
of 64, and 512 5 L 5 1024. q is another large prime, where 
q divides p - 1 and bit-length of q is 160. Let k be a primitive 
root modulo p (1 < h < p - 1) [3]. Set g = h(P-l)/q mod p .  
Therefore, q is the order of g modulo p .  
. 
" 
(2) Choosing H() H ( )  is a SHA hash function [161. 
(3) PrivatelPublic Key Pair of Customer Choosing 
a random number ice, zc E Z:, and computing 
yc = yZCmod p. The private key of the Customer is 
ZC, the public key is ye. 
(4) Identity of Customer Denoting IDc as the identity of 
the Customer. It is a bit-string that can identify the Customer. 
(5) Identity of E-Shop Denoting I D S  as the identity of 
the E-Shop. It is a bit-string that can identify the E-Shop. 
(6) PrivatelPublic Key Pair of TTP Choosing a 
random number z r ~ ~ ,  ZTTP E 2:. and computing 
YTTP = gzTTPmod p .  The private key of the Trusted Third 
Party is X T T ~ ,  the public key is Y T T P .  
(7) Identity of TTP Denoting I D T T ~  as the identity of 
the Trusted Third Party (TTP). It is a bit-string that is held 
by the Trusted Third Party. 
' 
B. Interaction between E-Shop and l T P  
This procedure can be accomplished through "off-line" with 
respect to the underlying transactions. That is to say, the 
interaction is processed (by some E-Shops and a Trusted Third 
Party) earlier than the coming transactions. In this algorithm, 
the Trusted Third Par&y will issue a pseudonym and a secret 
key for every E-Shop (ESL,  E&, , , , , .E&), by which the E- 
Shops can take part in the underlying transactions. The details 
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are the followings: 
(1) Registration , .  Each E-Shop ESi (I  5 z 5 n). registers .$) = g’g’mod p .  (7) 
’ herhis ideniity ID:’ (1 5 i 5 n) and a request R, (1 5 i 5 
(2) Creating Pseudonym The Trusted Third Party chooses 
These parameters will be ’ involved in the forthcoming 
transactions. n) to the Trusted Third Party, respectively. 
two different random numbers k ~ ~ p ,  E 2; and kg)  E 2, for 
each E-Shop ES, (1 5 i 5 n), respectively. And he/she then 
computes T T T ~ ,   
(2) Constructing Purchase Requirements According 
to the current purchase plan, the Customer will construct 
the corresponding purchase requirements. These purchase 
and 
rTTP, = gkTTPt mod p (1) requirements will be assigned to the corresponding mobile 
agents in order to seek an optimal transaction. The Customer 
constructs the purchase requirements as fallows: 
(2) 
The will play the role of the pseudonym for each E-Shop 
ES, (1 5 i 5 n), respectively. From the computation of nt’, 
we know that this pseudonym is linked to the identity of the 
corresponding E-Shop ESi (1 5 i 5 n), respectively. 
(10) (n) JL = Reqc . 
Since these Mobile Agents are prepared for the same purchase 
(3) Sending Messages The Trusted Third Party computes 
$1 
TTPI 
,(4 TTP - Q - T P H ( ~ ~  i) ) , T T T ~ ~ )  + kTTqmod q (3) plan, the purchase requirements are all equal, i.e. 
and then sends the tuple In!), &LP, TTTP,} to each E-Shop f J1 = J2 . . . = Jt = Jc,  (‘1) , 
5 2 5 .) through a Secure where Jc is defined as the purchase requirement. 
It includes: (1) the description of a desired product; (2) ’$&P be a partial private Of the corresponding 
E-Shop. an expiration date and time-stamp, that implies the valid 
purchase period; (3) the maximum price that is mcepted to 
(4) Checking private After each E-Shop the Customer; (4) a due date for  the ,deli,y-y of the product; 
and (5) an addressfor rhe deljVev of the product. (1 5 2 5 n) receives the above tuple, shehe check 
whether the tuple satisfies the following equation 
I I ( n y . T T T P i , l  = g s g ; p .  (4) 
If it holds, the E-Shop ES; (1 5 i 5 n) will have ,:hp 
as a partial private key, and ng) as the pseudonym which 
keeps ,$bp secret, and makes n$ as well as r ~ ~ p ~  public. 
(3) Constructing Partial Secrets The Customer will con- 
struct some partial secrets, that will be used by some E-Shop 




is Iinked to herhis idnetity I d i ) .  Therefore, this E-Shop 
Trusted Third Party with another request RI. 
s(l)  c = s c H (  J1, r p )  + k p  
= x c H ( J c ,  $I) + k,$)mod q; 
SE) = s c H ( J z , ~ ,  (2)  ) + kc (2) 
If the equation does not hold, this E-Shop will register to the (12) 
C. Preparing Mobile Agents 
As soon as the Customer initializes any purchase, shehe 
arrange them to some E-Shops ES, (1 5 a 5 n) for the 
... 
will prepare some mobile agents M A l ,  MA2,  . . . , MA, and 
purchase plan; where n > 1 is a positive integer. The details 
(1) Constructing Public Parameters The Customer 
s p  = Z,H(J,, $1) + k g )  
are the followings: = z c H ( J c ,  T $ ) )  +- k,$)mod q. (14) 
chooses random numbers k,$j E 2;’ k ,  (2) E Zp‘. . . . , kg) E 
Zp‘, and computes 
(4) Equipping Mobile Agents The Customer will equip 
these mobile agents with the above public parameters and 
partial secrets. In detal, the Customer provides each Mobile 
Agent MA, (1 5 j 5 n) with the corresponding tuple 
r g )  = gkg’mod p.  
~ g )  = g‘C mod p ,  
( 5 )  
(6) 
( 2 )  
..., { J C ,  qS2)) ,+cI  .4(I&)l, (15) 
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respectively. Here, E (~2)) is the ciphertext of the j - th 
cryptosystem of an E-Shop, to whom the j - t k  Mobile Agent 
M A j  will migrate for the purchase plan of the Customer. 
'partial private key sc 23) , and E j ( )  is a specific public key 
' 
D. Mobile Agents,Migrating 
As soon as the Mobile Agents are equipped with the 
corresponding tuple defined as Equation (*), the different 
Mobile Agent will migrate to the different E-Shop to search an 
optimal purchase. Without loss of generality, we may assume 
that the i-th Mobile Agent M A ,  migrates to the i-th E-Shop 
ESi, where 1 5 i 5 n. The followings are the details: 
( 1 )  Migrating The i-th Mobile Agent M A ,  migrates with 
the tuple 
{JC, Ei(&)), 7%, W D c ) }  (14) 
to the i-th E-Shop ESi; where E{( )  is the public key 
encryption algorithm of E&; and Ei(s,$') is the ciphertext 
of the i-th partial private key sg) under the piblic key 
encryption algorithm Ei() ofkthe i-th E-Shop ESi. 
(2) Checking Time-stamp After the Mobile Agent M A i  
arrives at the ES,, the E-Shop E& gets the tuple 
' IJC, Eics;'), 7% Ez(I&)) (17) 
and checks whether the purchase requirement J c  is legal 
or not. That is, the i-th E-Shop will examine whether the 
time-stamp on J c  is valid. If it is not valid, this E-Shop will 
stop, since this purchase request is out of date. If it is valid, 
this E-Shop will go on the next step. . 
(3) Obtaining Partial Secret After the Mobile Agent 
M A ,  arrives at the ES,, the E-Shop ES,  gets the tuple 
{Jc,Et(sg)), rk ,  E , ( IDc) )  and decrypts E,(s$)) and 
E,( IDc)  by using herhis private key corresponding to the 
encryption algonthm E, (). Consequently, the E-Shop obtains 
the partial secret .$I. Sheihe will keep sg) secret while 
making rg) public. 
(4) Checkin The E-Shop ESi will check .whether the 
partial secret SE) is valid with respect. to the corresponding 
public parameter T;).  Shehe checks whether ' 
If it is not valid, this E-Shop will stop, since the current 
purchase plan may be spoiled. If it is valid, this E-Shop will 
take part in the bidding for the purchase plan of the Customer. 
E. Processing Transactions 
In this procedure, the i-th E-Shop will first construct herhis 
own bidding key Sbrd. by which this E-Shop can bid for the 
purchase plan initialised by the Customer. Shehe will then 
construct the bidding of herhis goods to this purchase. And 
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then, the i-th Modile Agent will be equipped with this bidding 
and return to its owner, i.e. the Customer. Note that the bidding 
key i s  kept secret by this E-Shop. The detailsof this procedure 
is as follows: 
( I )  Constructing Bidding Key So far, the i-th E-Shop 
holds some parameters produced by the Trusted Third Party as 
well as the Customer. This E-Shop will first computes herhis 
bidding key as S b t d ,  
And then, shehe computes Y b i d ,  
In the end, the z-th E-Shop makes Y b l d  public while keeping 
Sbid secret. 
(2) Proposing the Bid According to the purchase 
requirement Jc ,  the i-th E-Shop proposes the corresponding 
bid for Jc. This bid is defined as B b l d .  And &,id includes: (1) 
the description of the i-th E-Shop's goods; (2) the minimum 
price that will be acceptable to the z-th E-Shop; (3) a due 
date for the delivery of the goods; (4) a bank account number 
provided by the i-th E-Shop; (5) a due date for transferring 
money into the bank account; (6) an expiration date and 
time-stamp, that implies the valid period of the bid &d. ' 
(3) Signing the Bid In order to make this bid confirmed 
and accepted by the Customer, the i-th E-Shop will put a legal 
signature on the bid &d. This will not only help the i-th E- 
Shop improve the possibility of the Customer accepting this 
bid, but also help the Customer to verify whether this bid i s  
really from the i-th E-Shop, as well as prevent the i-th E- 
Shop from denying providing this bid for the purchase plan. 
The details of this procedure is as follows: 
The i-th E-Shop computes m, 
The a-th E-Shop chooses a random number k, k E Z,*, 
and sets 
a = (gkmod p)mod g;  (22) 
w The i - th  E-Shop computes 0, 
Therefore, the signature on the bid &id is {a, p} ,  
(4) Arranging MA to Return The i-th E-Shop equips the 
&id,T$),n$),IDc, J i ,a ,P .  . (24) 
This tuple represents the whole transaction. The i-th Mobile 
Agent then returns to its owner, i.e. the Customer. 
i-th Mobile Agent MAi with the tuple: 
E Checkiug Transactions 
As soon as the i-th Mobile Agent returns to the Customer, 
the Customer first checks the transaction tuple, and then 
decides whether to accept this bid. The followings are the 
details: 
(1) The Customer first checks whether Ji = Jc. If it 
holds, shehe continues the next steps. Otherwise, shehe will 
arrange the j-th Mobile Agent M A j  (where 1 5 j 2 n 
and j # i) to seek an optimal bid for the current purchase plan. 
(2) The Customer computes = H ( m ,  a)P-lmod q. 
( 3 )  The Customer computes TZ = @-‘mod q. 
(4) The Customer verifies whether the fotlowing equation 
holds 
(gri yi:dmod p)mod q = cy. 
If it holds, the Customer accepts this bid as valid. If it does 
not hold, the Customer will arrange the j-th Mobile Agent 
M A j  (where 1 5 j 5 n and j # ij to seck an optimal bid 
for the current purchase plan. 
G. Auditing i-th E-Shop 
The following scenario may take place: After verifying 
the transaction tuple, the Customer accepts the bid B b z d  as 
an optimal bid. Therefore, she transfers some money as the 
price listed in the bid. However, the i-th E.Shop denies ever 
receiving any money and sending any bid. How can we deal 
with this situation? Who will audit the i-th E-Shop? The 
details given below provides a solution to this scenario. 
(1) The Customer sends the tuple {a,n$),P} 
(which is from the whole transaction tuple 
B bid, p , ny  , I D c 1  J,, a, p.) to the Trusted Third Party. 
(2) The Trusted Third Party replies the tuple {ID:), I C ; ) }  
to the Customer. 
(3) The Trusted Third Party audits the i-th E-Shop by using 
the following equation: 
Since the Trusted Third Party holds ng) and kg), the i-th 
E-Shop will be identified and audited. 
Iv. CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS AND SECURITY PROOFS 
This paper has presented a new electronic commerce pro- 
tocol for transactions using mobile agents. And a trusted tbird 
party is involved in the proposed protocol. It is interesting to 
analyze how the protocol works. Most importantly, security 
of the protocol should be maintained, since the transactions 
are initiated over the Internet. And Intemet is a site where 
there exist a number of attacks, from passive attacks to active 
attacks, from external attacks to internal attacks [161, [191. 
A. Construction Analysis 
Generally speaking, construction analysis serves as’ a func- 
tional deloyment from the construction, operationability, and 
functioning points of view, This .subsection will provide a 
deployment for the proposed. transaction protocol. 
In our protocol, we have introduced a customer, a trusted 
third party, an E-shop, and a number of mobile agents. 
However, in a virtual electronic commerce environment, there 
will be more than one customer as well as more than one 
E-shop. For the complex scenario, it is easy to extend the 
proposed protocol to a multiple level of electronic commerce 
transactions protocol. Therefore, in the following we only 
deploy the protocol from the simple and concise perspective. 
(1) Role of the Customer: The customer first proposes a 
purchase plan. Around the purchase plan, she constructs the 
purchase requirements . 
51 = Jz = ... = Jt = J c ,  (25)  
which direct the underlying E-shops to bid for the purchase 
plan. Here, J c  includes: (1) the description of a desired 
product; (2) an expiration date and time-stamp, that implies 
the valid purchase period; (3) the maximum price that is 
accepted to the Customer; (4) a due date for the delivery of 
the product; and ( 5 )  an address for the delivery of the product. 
Also, the customer constructs mobile codes 
IJC, E , ( s g ) ) , & w D c ) ) ,  (26) 
for the mobile agents. Note that a vdid signature on the bid 
includes J c .  That is, J c  is used IO restrict the context ofthe 
bidding tuken by the E-shops. Other parts of the mobile code, 
i.e. 
{E3 (SE)), 6, ( I D C ) }  
is used to generate the bidding key for the E-shops. 
Another duty of the customer is she will verify the bids 
returned by the mobile.agents. If it is valid, she will transfer 
some money to the E-shop’s bank account. 
(2) Functioning.of the Mobile Agents: The main duty of the 
mobile agents is to help its owner accomplish the purchase 
plan. They actually interact with their owner and the E-shops, 
respectively. (As noted in Remark 1, We know that the E-shops 
are also some mobile agents.) For the interaction between the 
mobile agents and their owner, the mobile agents are equipped 
with some mobile codes: 
{Jc ,E , (S~)) ,T3CrE3(IDG)} ,  (28) 
where I 5 j 5 w. For the interaction with the E-shops, the 
mobile agents transport some bids: 
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(3) Role of the TTP: A trusted third party is involved in 
the protocol. TTP has two different roIes: one is to record the 
registration of the E-shops, and help the E-shops generate the 
bidding keys . In order to fulfil this, the TTP sends the tuple 
{ n g ) ~  s $ & p ~  TTTP,}  
to each E-Shop ES, (1 5 i 5 n) through a secure channel, 
respectively. Here, s$kp, 
( 2 )  ( t )  
+Tp = ~ T T P H ( ~ ~  ), T T T P , )+ ~ T T T P , ~ O ~  Q. (30) 
The other role of TTP is to audit the E-shops during the course 
of the transactions. This service is accomplished using the 
following equation: 
N( JD$) R, IC;)) = n$). 
. (4) Role of the E-shops: The E-shops take part in bidding 
for the purchase initiated by the customer. Therefore, The E- 
shops need to have bidding private key and public key: Sbid 
(i) (4 (1) 
a d  ?/bid. 
Sbrd = sc H(s7-77p1 ID,)? s ~ ~ p m o d  4 .  (31) 
and 
ybid = gSbbdmod p 
3. Security Proofs’ 
This subsection, we wilI prove that the proposed transaction 
protocol satisfy the following security properties: (1) strong 
unforgeability of any bid of the underlying E-shops. This 
property is valid with respect to the customer. (2) fair 
identifiability of the underlying E-shops. This property is 
valid with respect to the E-shops. (3) verifiability of the 
bid of the underlying E-shops. This property is valid with 
respect to any one who holds the related public parameters. 
(4) strong undeniability of the bid in the transactions. This 
property is valid with respect to the E-shops. The details are 
the followings: 
(1) Strong unforgeability of any bid of the underlying E- 
shops. This property is valid with respect to the customer. 
This means that the Customer is not able to forge valid any 
bid on behalf of any underlying E-shop. From Equation (3) 
. and (31), we have 
It is difficult to figure out the value of $bid ,  since ICTTP,  and 
ZTTP are two random and private elements of 2;. If the 
customer tries to tackle Equation (20), she will need to solve 
the discrete logarithm problem [16]. On the other hand, from 
Equation (22) and (23), the underlying bidding signature is 
based on the DSS [ 1 XI. Therefore, the strong unforgeability 
is maintained. 
(2) Fair Identifiability of the underIying E-shops. This 
property is valid with respect to the E-shops. Fair identifiability 
means that no one is able to identify the underlying E- 
shop whose bid is accepted by the customer. An exceptional 
situation is the trusted third party can identify the underlying 
E-shop through the pseudonym. This only takes place when 
the E-shop denies ever bidding and receiving money in the 
transactions. In fact, from the signature generated by the E- 
shop 
(4 ii) 
, BbidlrC Ins , IDc?J i l f f lP~ 
any one except cannot identify the underlying E-shop. This 
is because: (a) B b i d  ={the description of the underlying 
E-Shop’s goods; the minimum price that will be acceptable 
to the underlying E-Shop; a due date for the delivery of the 
goods; a bank account number provided by the underlyinig 
E-Shop; a due date for transferring money into the bank 
account; an expiration date and time-stamp.} It does not leak 
any information of the identit for the underlying E-shop. 
using a hash function. 
and (b) ng) = H ( I @ ) ,  Ri, ki J ). Therefore, ID;  is mapped 
(3) Verifiability of the bid of the underlying E-shops. This 
property is valid with respect to any one who holds the 
related public parameters. Verifiability means that any one 
who holds the related public parameters can check whether a 
bid is valid. It i s  easy to conclude this point from the process 
of Checking Transactions (see Section 3. F). 
(4) Undeniability of the bid in the transactions. This 
property i s  valid with respect to the E-shops. Undeniability 
means that the underlying E-shop cannot deny she ever 
generated a valid signature on the bid. In fact, from 
Equation (29) we know that nk is theoretically linked 
to this E-shop. More importantly, the verifying equation 
(gTlyi:dmod p)mod q = Q implies this E-shop ever generated 
the signature on the bid. This point is derived from the 
procedure of Processing Transactions as well as Checking 
Transactions. 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
The performance of .the proposed electronic commerce 
protocol can be discussed from two aspects: off-line workloads 
and on-line workloads. 
The off-line workloads mainly include the computation cost. 
The procedures of System Setup, Preparing Mobile Agents, 
and Processing Transactions can be all dealt with through 
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[ne off-line mode. The computation cost is discussed with 
respect to one customer with one E-shop. The underlying 
computation costs are dominated by one modular exponen- 
tiation computation, one hash function computation, and two 
encryption computations for the procedure of System Setup; 
one modular multiplication, one modular exponentiation, one 
hash function evaluation for the procedure of Preparing Mobile 
Agents; one modular exponentiation, one modular inversion, 
one hash function evaluation, one modular multiplication for 
the procedure of Processing Transactions. 
The on-line workloads also mainly include the communica- 
tion cost and the computation cost. The procedures of Inter- 
action between E-shops and TTP, Mobile Agents Migrating, 
and Checking Transactions as well as Auditing i-th E-shop 
can be all dealt with through the on-line mode. We discuss 
the on-line workloads with respect to one-time successful 
transaction between the customer and the underlying E-shop. 
The communication cost is one round of communication 
between the E-shop and the TTP, one round of communication 
between the underlying mobile agent and the E-shop (resp. 
the Customer), and one round of communication between 
the customer and the TTP. The corresponding computation 
costs are dominated by one modular exponentiation, one 
hash function evaluation, one hash evaluation, one modular 
multiplication, two modular exponentiations for the procedure 
of Interaction between E-shops and TTP; two modular expo- 
nentiations for the procedure of Mobile Agents Migrating; one 
modular inversion evaluation, one hash function evaluation, 
three modular multiplications, two modular exponentiations 
for the procedure of Checking Transactions; one hash function 
evaluation for the procedure of Auditing i-th E-shop. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has proposed a new electronic commerce proto- 
col. The proposed protocol integrates mobile agents with the 
underlying transactions, The mobile agents help to accomplish 
the purchase plan initiated by the customer. A trusted authority 
is integrated and plays two important different roles: one is 
help the E-shops register; the other is help to maintain the fair 
privacy. We have provided proofs for construction and security. 
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